Clause Deep-Dive · Fiduciary Duties · revised 28 April 2026

LLC Fiduciary Duties ClauseDuty of care, duty of loyalty, modification permitted by state, sample clause language

Fiduciary duties define the standard of conduct that managers and (in some structures) members owe to the LLC and to each other. The two core duties, care and loyalty, exist by default in every state. Some states permit the operating agreement to modify or eliminate the default duties; others do not. Delaware is the most permissive: under 6 Del. C. § 18-1101(c), the operating agreement may expand, restrict, or eliminate fiduciary duties entirely, except for the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This page sets out what the duties require, where they can be modified, and sample clause language for the most common drafting choices.
General legal information, not legal advice
The summaries below are general legal information, not legal advice. Fiduciary duty modifications interact with state law and case law in nuanced ways; consult a licensed attorney before modifying or eliminating fiduciary duties in any operating agreement, particularly outside Delaware.
A.

The Three Fiduciary Duties

The duty of care requires fiduciaries to act with the diligence and prudence of a reasonably careful person in similar circumstances. In LLCs the duty of care is typically the lowest-bar fiduciary duty; gross negligence is the usual standard for breach, and simple business mistakes do not breach the duty. A manager who carefully considers a decision, reviews relevant information, consults professionals where appropriate, and acts in what they reasonably believe to be the LLC's best interest has satisfied the duty of care, even if the decision turns out poorly.

The duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to act in the best interests of the LLC, not in their personal interest. Specific obligations: do not compete with the LLC, do not usurp LLC business opportunities, do not engage in self-dealing transactions without disclosure and disinterested approval, do not misuse LLC assets or confidential information for personal gain, and disclose conflicts of interest. Loyalty is the most-litigated of the fiduciary duties because the boundary between personal and LLC interest is often fact-specific.

The duty of good faith (or the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing) exists in every state and cannot be eliminated, even in Delaware. It requires parties to act consistently with the reasonable expectations of other parties under the operating agreement. The duty is narrower than care or loyalty: it polices behaviour that, while not technically breaching a written term, undermines the spirit of the agreement.

B.

Modification by State

StateModification Permitted
DelawarePermits expansion, restriction, or elimination of fiduciary duties (6 Del. C. § 18-1101(c)); implied covenant of good faith cannot be waived
CaliforniaDefault duty of care and duty of loyalty apply to managers; modification permitted but elimination unclear
New YorkDefault duties apply; can be modified by operating agreement under NY LLC Law § 417 but not eliminated entirely
TexasPermits broad modification; nonwaivable items limited to good faith covenant and statutory protections
FloridaRULLCA approach: duty of care and loyalty default; modifications permitted but not elimination
RULLCA states (general)Permit modification of duties subject to limitations; elimination generally not permitted

Delaware's 6 Del. C. § 18-1101(c) is the most permissive provision. It explicitly states that the operating agreement may "expand, restrict, or eliminate" the default fiduciary duties of managers and members. The only exception is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under § 18-1101(e), which cannot be waived. This is one of the principal reasons large private equity, joint venture, and sophisticated investor LLCs are formed in Delaware.

C.

Default Restrictions Under Duty of Loyalty

ConductDefault Treatment
Competing with the LLCDefault: prohibited under duty of loyalty
Pursuing LLC business opportunities personallyDefault: prohibited under corporate-opportunity doctrine
Self-dealing transactions (related-party deals)Default: permitted with disclosure and disinterested approval
Using LLC assets for personal benefitDefault: prohibited
Disclosing LLC confidential informationDefault: prohibited
Voting on matters affecting personal interestDefault: vote may be cast but the underlying transaction subject to fairness scrutiny
D.

Sample Fiduciary Duties Clauses

Standard Default Duties (No Modification)The Manager and each Member acting in a management capacity owe to the Company and to the Members the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty as those duties are defined under the laws of the State of [State]. The duty of care requires acting with the diligence of a reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances. The duty of loyalty requires acting in the best interests of the Company, avoiding conflicts of interest, not competing with the Company, and not usurping Company business opportunities. The Manager and Members shall also act consistently with the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Delaware-Style Modification (Restriction of Duties)To the maximum extent permitted by 6 Del. C. § 18-1101(c), the fiduciary duties of the Manager and Members are modified as follows: (a) the duty of care is satisfied by the Manager's good-faith judgment, and shall not be breached except by reckless disregard or willful misconduct; (b) the duty of loyalty does not prohibit the Manager or any Member from engaging in other businesses, even if competitive, or from pursuing personal opportunities, even if such opportunities would otherwise be Company business opportunities. Provided, however, that the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing under 6 Del. C. § 18-1101(e) is not modified and continues to apply to all conduct of the Manager and Members.
Self-Dealing Approval ProcedureAny transaction between the Company and a Manager, Member, or affiliate of either (a "Related-Party Transaction") is permitted, notwithstanding any fiduciary duty otherwise applicable, if the transaction is: (a) disclosed in writing to all Members in advance, including all material terms; (b) approved in writing by Members holding at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Percentage Interests held by Members not participating in the transaction; and (c) on terms no less favourable to the Company than would be obtained in an arm's-length transaction with an unrelated third party. The Company shall maintain written records of all Related-Party Transactions.
Business Opportunity AllocationEach Member acknowledges that the other Members may engage in business activities outside the Company (including activities that may be competitive with the Company). No Member shall be required to offer any business opportunity to the Company before pursuing it personally, except for opportunities that (a) the offering Member learns of solely through the Member's role in the Company, and (b) are within the same industry vertical and customer segment as the Company's current business. Opportunities meeting both criteria shall be offered to the Company first; the Company has thirty (30) days to accept.
E.

Five Fiduciary Duties Mistakes

Eliminating fiduciary duties without understanding the consequence

Eliminating duties protects the manager but exposes minority members. Do this only with informed consent of all members and only in Delaware (where it is clearly permitted).

Forgetting the implied covenant

Even Delaware does not permit waiver of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Drafting that purports to waive everything is overreach and may invalidate the entire fiduciary modification.

Ambiguous self-dealing rules

'Manager may engage in transactions with the LLC' is too broad; 'Manager may not engage in any transaction with the LLC' is too restrictive. Specify the disclosure-plus-disinterested-approval procedure.

No business opportunity allocation

When members run multiple businesses, the corporate-opportunity doctrine creates ambiguity over which opportunities belong to which entity. Pre-agreed allocation reduces disputes.

Modifying duties in non-Delaware states

California, New York, and most non-Delaware states permit only limited modification. Drafting that works in Delaware may be unenforceable elsewhere.

Further Reading